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Lessons from Recent Collapses of Metal Buildings 
By David B. Peraza, P .E. 
Senior Associate, LZA Technology, New York, NY 
This paper presents case studies of three roof collapses of metal buildings, 
discusses the most signigicant features of each case, and summarizes lessons learned that 
can be used to reduce future failures. 
Freezer Buildings 
On March 5,1994, two attached freezer buildings collapsed under a snow load. 
The buildings were located near Harrisburg, P A. The buildings were owned by a food 
distributor and contained racks nearly 30 feet high for frozen food storage. These racks 
actually prevented the roof from falling to the ground. The claimed loss, primarily for 
food spoilage, was on the order of $20 million dollars. 
The buildings had been built in 1983 and in 1991, and their general arrangement 
is shown in Figure 1. For both buildings, the Owner had contracted with the same 
DesignlBuilder, who in turn subcontracted the design and fabrication to the same Metal 
Building EngineerlManufacturer (Engineer). 
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Figure 1: Roof Plan 
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At the time that the 1983 building was designed, it was anticipated that a freezer 
addition would be built at a later date along one side of the building. The vertical load 
from the future building was included in the design of the appropriate columns. 
In 1991, the small loading dock was dismantled to make way for the freezer 
addition. Lean-to brackets were welded to each colunm where the addition would attach. 
These brackets, and the moments transferred through the brackets, became a focal point 
of the investigation. 
LZA Technology was retained by the Builder shortly after the collapse. 
Subsequently, we were retained by attorneys representing the Builder's insurance carrier. 
The case eventually settled before going to trial. 
Description of Structure 
The 1983 Building measured approximately 121 feet by 155 feet in plan, and had 
a single slope roof. Its structure typically consisted of steel frames spaced at 19 feet and 
20 feet, with one line of intermediate columns. The frames were composed of built-up 
plate girders, built-up columns, and intermediate round pipe columns. The secondary 
roof members consisted of 8-inch deep Z purlins spaced at 5 feet on center. Metal deck, 
1 liz" deep, was screwed to the purlins and supported seven inches of insulation and a 
ballasted roof membrane. 
The original loading dock was a "lean-to" structure. The three loading dock 
rafters attached to the freezer building columns via shim plates, as shown in Figure 3a. 
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Figure 2: Typical Roof Construction 
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In 1991, the loading dock was dismantled to make way for the freezer addition. 
This involved, among other things, unbolting the three rafters from the columns. Prior to 
erection of the new building, lean-to brackets were welded to each of the eight columns 
along the high side of the old building. The addition consisted of two buildings: a freezer 
and a large, independent loading dock. The combined buildings are shown in Figure 1. 
The new rafters were attached to the old building's columns via welded lean-to brackets. 
The erection drawings did not contain any special instructions as to how to attach the 
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Figure 3: Connection Details at Original Loading Dock 
lean-to brackets, and they were erected as shown in as in Figure 3b. The construction of 
the 1991 freezer was similar to that of the 1983 building. 
Snow Loads 
Measurements ofthe snow weight on the roof made shortly after the collapse. 
These indicated an average weight of 45 psf. The measurements, which appear well 
documented, were made at two locations that appeared to be representative. Sample 1 
contained 10 inches of snow over 4 inches of ice, and weighed 45 psf; sample 2 
contained 13 Yz inches of snow over 2 inches of ice, and weighed 44 psf. 
Data from the Harrisburg airport weather station indicates that the depth snow on 
the ground on the day of the collapse was 8 inches, and that earlier in the season it had 
been as high as 18 inches. 
For the 1983 building, BOCA 1981 was in effect at the time of the design of this 
building, and the Engineer certified that the design met MBMA 1981. The roof snow 
design load calculates to 16.7 psf, based on 19 psf ground snow, the MBMA thermal 
factor of1.1, and a 0.8 exposure factor. 
For the 1991 building, BOCA 1990 was in effect. For unheated buildings, the 
Commentary to BOCA 1990 directs the user to the ASCE 71 standard. The roof design 
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load calculates to 21 psf, based on 25 psf ground snow, a thermal factor of 1.2, and other 
appropriate formula factors. 
Structural Analyses 
Extensive structural analyses were made to assess the adequacy of the roof 
structure. The analyses focused on the adequacy of the purlins and the frames when 
SUbjected to the design loads. The design loads included the self-weight of the structure 
plus an allowance 45 psffor superimposed dead and live loads. Of this allowance, 
approximately 13 psfis used for the ballasted roofing system and suspended loads, 
leaving 32 psf for snow and for localized equipment loads. 
For the 1983 building, the purlins near the end rafters were found to be 
overstressed 20% to 41 % in combined shear and bending. These overstresses occur at the 
end of the purlin overlaps at the first interior rafter. Similarly, for the 1991 building, the 
purlins near the end rafters were overstressed as much as 38% in combined shear and 
bending. 
For the 1991 building, widespread instances of web crippling ofthe purlins was 
found in the interior bays. Overstresses ranged from 20% to 30% for design loadings, as 
compared to AISI 1986/89. A check for web crippling could not be found in the design 
calculations 
Regarding the rafters, serious overstresses were found near each lean-to bracket. 
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At these locations, the 1983 
rafter is overstressed 96% in 
negative bending, and the 
1991 rafter is similarly 
overstressed 27% for design 
loads. The severe overstresses 
are due to the fact that the 
connections were detailed in a 
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manner inconsistent with the 
design assumption. The 
design assumption was that 
shear connections would be 
used to attach the new rafters 
to the original building 
columns, and therefore the 
original columns would only [ I I I I 
b) As-Detailed 
Figure 4 : Moment Diagrams for Frames 
I have to be designed for the added vertical load. However, 
the connection was detailed as 
a moment connection. Figure 
4 contrasts these two 
conditions and the effect on 
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the negative moment. 
In addition, three of the 
lean-to brackets were inadequately 
fastened to the columns. The 
engineer overlooked that three of 
the columns, the ones to which the 
original loading dock rafters had 
attached, had shim plates. 
Originally, these shim plates were 
bolted to each other. These bolts 
were removed in order to dismantle 
the old loading dock, and were not 
replaced when the lean-to bracket 
Figure 5: Failed connection. was welded on, as can be seen in 
Figure 5. The only attachment 
between the shim plates was then the non-structural "seam welds" around their perimeter. 
These seam welds had to transfer the shear and the moment from the new rafters. 
Calculations showed these seam welds, which would never have been relied upon by a 
design engineer, actually did have substantial strength that prevented the collapse from 
occurring sooner. 
Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
Numerous design deficiencies related to the purlins were identified, some of 
which may have allowed the collapse to progress. 
But the most serious deficiencies related to the rafters, more particularly the 
connections of the new rafters to the original columns. The detailing of these 
connections introduced moments that the original structure was not designed for, and 
neglected the fact that there were shim plates present at some columns that required 
special attention. 
In spite of these deficiencies, it is likely that the structure would not have 
collapsed had it not been for the snow overload. This is due primarily to the fact that the 
loads used for the design were in excess of that required by code. 
•. Make sure that the detailing is consistent with the design assumptions. For example, 
connections that are assumed to transmit shear should be detailed as such, and 
connections assumed to transmit moment should be detailed as such. 
• Provide clear and explicit erection instructions for special conditions, such as when 
connecting to an existing structure. 
• Research regarding the effect of refrigerated roofs on snow load may be needed. In 
this case, the measured snow weight was more than twice the values required by 
code, and this magnitude ofload is not explainable from weather records. This may 
be due to the freezer nature of the facility, which experiences minimal melt-off and 
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may have frozen drainage paths, Current codes address unheated roofs, but not roofs 
intentionally kept below freezing, 
• Design engineers must be familiar with current codes, and must be thoroughly 
familiar with the limitations of design software, In this particular case, checks for 
puriin web crippling and combined shear/bending could not be found in the 
calculations, 
ManufacturingIWarehou5e Facility 
This facility is located in Edison, New Jersey, It consists of two main buildings: a 
Manufacturing Building and a Warehouse Building, The two buildings are connected by 
a narrow "Breezeway" structure, The Manufacturing Building was built in the 1960s, In 
1986, the owner contracted with a builder firm to provide a new addition, which 
consisted of the Warehouse Building and the connecting Breezeway, The roof height of 
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Figure 6: Roof Plan 
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the Breezeway me was substantially lower than that ofthe abutting bUildings. Figure 6 
shows the overall layout of the buildings. 
Failure of a portion of the Breezeway roof occurred about a week after the 
January 1996 blizzard that blanketed the northeast United States. Sometime between the 
late evening hours of January 14 (Sunday), 1996, and the early morning hours of January 
15, the roofpurlins, particularly near the ridgeline of the roof, rolled and sagged 
excessively, although they did not actually collapse to the ground. 
LZA Technology was retained, about a year after the failure, by attorneys 
representing the designlbuilder. 
Description of Breezeway Structure 
. The Breezeway measured approximately 20' by 220' in plan, and the roof sloped 
down from an off center ridge line at a rate of 1 inch per foot. 
The roof sheathing is a 24-gauge standing seam roof system, with a low floating 
clip. This roof sheathing is supported on purlins, which span the 20-foot width of the 
Breezeway. The purlins are 12-gauge 8" deep cold-formed Z sections, spaced at intervals 
of 1'-9". The purlins are supported at their ends by 'rafter' beams, which are typically 
hot-rolled W12x16 sections. The purlins are bolted to upstanding 'fin plates' welded to 
the top flanges of the rafters. 
Strap Bracing for Purlins 
In the course of legal proceedings, two questions arose regarding the strap 
bracing: (1) Had it been installed, and, if so, what was its arrangement? These questions 
arose due to lack of clarity of the erection drawings. 
Strap bracing is not shown pictorially on the erection drawings, but it is called for 
in a round-about manner. A note on the erection drawings reads, "Note: See sheet S43-X 
for PM-5 installation." Sheet S43-X is an 8 \1," by II" standard detail sheet that shows 
the configuration of purl in bracing for a generic building, and "PM-5" turns out to be the 
strap material, per the shipping manifest. 
An isometric view, reproduced as Figure 7, clearly shows plan bracing along the 
eaves, anchored the rafters. This arrangement is effective for anchoring the transverse 
strap that continues up the roof. But what happens to that transverse strap after a few 
purlins? Does it bend down to the bottom flange of the next purlin, creating the "criss-
cross" shown in the elevation? The effectiveness ofthe bracing provided by such an 
arrangement is highly questionable, given the interrupted nature of the perpendicular 
straps and their "anchorage" to tension flanges. Or was it the fabricator's intent to have 
plan bracing wherever the criss-cross arrangement is indicated? If so, then the 
arrangement must differ significantly from the plan bracing at the eave, which extends 
over a pair of purl in bays. And to be effective, the plan bracing would have to be 
anchored to the rafters, which is not indicated. Or perhaps the intent was to have plan 
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bracing along the ridgeline. And finally, what exactly is meant by "brace band"? The 
isometric indicates that the plan diagonals are the brace bands, but a note calls for brace 
bands at the 113 points for a 20 foot span, suggesting that the transverse straps are the 
brace bands. What this detail sheet means, only the fabricator knows for sure! 
Ironically, the transverse bracing would be much easier to erect, and it would be 
much more effective, if it were simply run continuously from eave to peak, and then 
down to the other eave, thereby eliminating the criss-crosses. 
Figure 7: "Isometric View" reproduced from standard detail sheet 
NOTE!! NO MORE THAN (4) 7 . r BRACE BAND 
PURLIN SPACES BEFORE 
CRISS-CROSSING. _ _ ___ - -- - - r - ~ --T- - --
__ _ ---J---r- T;<J J r : 1. 
---r-r T~J L ~ "VI'smUT 'U'''N 
Figure 8: "Brace Band Installation" from standard detail sheet. Redrawn for clarity 
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Bracing Provided by Standing Seam Roof 
Due to the numerous questions about the installation of the strap bracing, as 
discussed in the preceding section, it became important to estimate the degree of bracing 
provided by the standing seam roof 
The percentage was estimated using a recently published design gnide', which is 
based primarily on research reported in 1990 by Professor Tom Murray at the Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute. Review of the test results on systems comparable to that used for 
the Breezeway indicates that the degree of bracing provided by the standing seam roof 
panels is on the order of 59%. In other words, even without any strap bracing, the purlins 
can carry approximately 59% of the load that they could carry if they were fully braced. 
Snow Loads 
The governing building code for the Breezeway design was The BOCA 
BasiclNational Building Code/1984 (BOCA 1984). The ground snow load for this 
building is sliglitly less than 20 pounds per square foot for a SO-year mean recurrence 
storm interval. Applying the appropriate code coefficients results in the loads shown in 
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Figure 9. The snow heights are based on the BOCA 1996 snow density fonnula, since 
BOCA 1984 did not contain a snow density fonnula. 
According to climatological data provided by NOAA for Newark airport, the 
January 7-8,1996 stonn deposited about 27 inches of snow over a 3 inch pre-existing 
snow cover. Low temperatures (15 to 19 degrees F) and high winds (30 to 40 mph) 
associated with the stonn combined to create optimum conditions for the fonnation of 
large snow drifts. Then on January 12 an additional 1.3 inches of snow was added. The 
water equivalent of precipitation in January, per NOAA, totaled about 3 inches, which is 
equivalent to a load of about 15 psf. In addition, NOAA reports that 1 inch of snow that 
already existed on January 1. This is considered a lower bound on the precipitation, due 
to the fact that weather station observations tend to "under catch" actual precipitation, 
particularly in windy conditions. Prior to the stonn, there was snow cover already 
present. 
DeGaetano estimates that the actual snow load in the Newark area following the 
January 1996 stonn was approximately 19 psf. This value includes snow that existed 
prior to the stonn and it also includes an adjustment factor to account for the "under 
catch" of the weather station measuring device. This value of 19 psf exceeds the BOCA 
unifonn design snow load of 16 psfby about 20%, and is equivalent to the snow load that 
would statistically be expected to occur once every 100 years. 
Anecdotal reports by employees indicated that there was 16' to 20' height of 
drifted snow on the Breezeway roof at the time of the failure. 
Structural Analysis 
We perfonned structural calculations to detennine the adequacy of the roof 
purlins to safely support the code-required loads. The adequacy of the purlins is best 
expressed as a "stress ratio," which is the imposed moment divided by the safe allowable 
moment. A value less than 1.00 indicates it is understressed; a value more than 1.00 
means it is overstressed. 
To calculate the bending moment in the purlins, we used the code snow loads plus 
9.7 psffor collateral loads plus purlin self-weight. For the assumed case of fully braced 
purlins, the purlins experience a stress ratio of only 0.48 in bending (54.5 k-inches 
applied/112.2 k-inches allowable) when subjected to code design loads. Ifpurlin strap 
bracing had not been installed, then the purlins would have been braced solely by the roof 
panels. As discussed previously, this partial bracing would allow the purlins to carry 
approximately 59% ofthe load that they could carry if fully braced. Using the same 
design loads, we calculate a stress ratio of 0.82 for the purlins in bending (54.5 k-in.! 59% 
of 112.2 k-in.). This stress ratio indicates that even ifbracing straps were absent, the 
purlins were capable of safely carrying the design loads. 
However, there was no indication in the calculations that the engineer/fabricator 
relied on the standing seam roofto brace the purlins. All indications were that the purlins 
were intended to be braced by the straps. 
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Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
In this case, it appears that the failure was caused by a drifted snow load that 
substantially exceeded the code-mandated values. This is based on the fact that the purlin 
design was adequate, plus the evidence that the snow loads present exceeded the code 
design values. Even ifthe strap bracing had not been installed, the purlins received 
sufficient incidental bracing from the standing seam roofto safely support the code-
required loads. Evidence that the snow load exceeded the BOCA values is provided by 
meteorological data, published literature, and anecdotal observations by employees ofthe 
facility. 
Although it does not appear that the strap bracing was the culprit in this case, the 
lack of clarity of the erection drawings with respect to this important element was 
conspicuous. It is quite possible that if proper bracing had been provided, that the purlins 
would have been able to support the imposed overloads without damage 
Engineer/fabricators should carefully review the design assumptions that they 
make with respect to pUrlin bracing, and take steps to ensure that the bracing 
requirements are clearly communicated to the erector. 
Warehouse 
This building, which was used primarily for warehouse purposes, was located in 
Hamilton Township, New Jersey and was erected in early 1990. The building measured 
110 by 180 feet. The eave height of this single slope building varied from 16' to 20'7", 
at a rate of 112" per foot. A masonry perimeter infill wall occurred on all sides, with a 
masonry parapet on three sides and a gutter on the low side. The parapet was about 8" 
high along the high side of the roof, and about 5'3" at the low side of the roof 
Frames were spaced at 29' -1 0" intervals. The frames had one line of intermediate 




Figure 10: Isometric of Building 
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Roofpurlins, which were spaced at 5'-3", consisted of8" Z-shapes with 3 Yz" 
flanges, made of 12 gage material in the end spans and 14 gage elsewhere. Purlin laps of 
nearly 5 feet were called for over the rafter frames. Purlins were attached to rafters via 
fin plates welded to the rafters. Roof decking was a 24 gage standing seam roof system 
fastened to the purlins using one-piece clips. Erection drawings called for a line of strap 
bracing at midspan of the purlins, for both top and bottom flanges. 
A partial collapse of the roof occurred in the early morning hours of March 14, 
1993 under snow conditions. LZA Technology was retained some years after the 
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Figure 11: Roof Plan 
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A meteorological study estimated that the total precipitation from the March 13-
14, 1993 storm was between 12 and 18 inches, with a water equivalent of about 2 inches. 
This is equivalent to about 10 psf. During the storm, temperatures hovered around 
freezing, and precipitation included heavy wet snow, and rain, and freezing rain. Winds 
during the day (March 13) were from the East-Northeast and East-Southeast, with gusts 
up to 55 mph. There was no pre-existing snow load on the roof 
493 
A representative from the engineer/manufacturer inspected the building several 
days after the collapse and concluded that the cause of the collapse was excessive build-
up of ice and snow behind the parapets. No details of observed depths were provided. 
The engineer for the foundation inspected the building the morning after the 
collapse. He stated that there were 1.5 to 2 inches of an ice/snow mixture on the roof 
adjacent to the collapse area. 
Snow Drift Design 
Another issue debated during the legal proceedings was the apparent lack of 
consideration for snow drifting along the parapets. We were able to show that the design 
had sufficient inherent conservatism that drift loads did not have to be explicitly 
considered. 
BOCA 1987 governed the design of this building. Per BOCA, the ground snow 
load for the building was 25 psf. Using a snow exposure coefficient of O. 7, the uniform 
roof snow load was 17.5 psf. BOCA also required a drifted snow surcharge, as high as 
58 psf, be considered included at the location of the highest parapet. 
It was true that the calculations did not explicitly consider drifting snow. 
However, the design was based on a larger ground snow load (30 pst) than what was 
required by code (25 pst). The ground snow contours are closely spaced in the locale of 
the building, so it is likely that the highest snow load existing in the county, not the snow 
load at the location of the building, was used. This resulted in a uniform roof snow load 
of21 psf, as opposed to the 17.5 psfrequired by code. The uniform snow load design 
therefore controlled over the live load case of20 psf. 
Our calculations indicated that the moments and shears used to design the purlins 
were slightly larger than the moments and shears developed by the code snow load, even 
considering drifting, and the code minimum live load. Therefore, even though the design 
did not expliclty consider snow drifting, the roof structure was indeed capable of safely 
carrying the snow drift loads. 
Apparent Overstresses in Calculations 
A red herring that received considerable discussion during the legal proceedings 
was the apparent overstress of the purlins, as stated by the engineer's own calculations. 
The calculations appeared to indicate that certain purlins were overstressed 18% 
in bending, and that others are 0.8% overstressed. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, 
in the area of the apparent 18% overstress, the calculations were based on end-to-end lap 
lengths of2'-2", as opposed to the lap of nearly 5 feet indicated on the drawings. The 
design engineer recognized that the overstress was false, apparently made a side 
calculation, and annotated the computer output, "OK by inspection with 4'-11 Yz" total 
laps." Secondly, in the area of the slight overstress, the calculations were based on a span 
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length over a foot longer than the actual span. Apparently the span used was from an 
earlier, discarded design scheme for the building. 
We performed calculations that considered both ofthese factors, and were thus 
able to show that these overstresses did not in fact exist. 
Bracing of Purlins 
The most difficult issue in the case was the degree of bracing afforded to the 
puriins. The design engineer for the structure had assumed that the purlins were fully 
braced by the standing seam roof. The calculations did not include any test reports to 
substantiate this assumption. Engineers for the argued that the purlins were effectively 
unbraced for their entire span of nearly 30 feet. 
This is an issue that has received considerable attention in recent years by the 
metal building indus~. The fIrst comprehensive test data on this subject was published 
in November of 1990 .4, about 9 months after the building was erected. Using the values 
in this literature for comparable roof systems, we estimated that the bracing afforded the 
purlins by standing seam roof was about 60%. In other words, the partially braced 
purlins could safely support a moment equal to 60% of the safe load for the fully braced 
condition. Our calculations indicated that this amount of bracing would result in a 28% 
overstress of the purlins when subjected to the code snow load. This degree of overstress 
is serious. However, climatological data indicated that the precipitation (10pst) was less 
than the code value (17.5 pst) by a signifIcant margin. Ratioing the stress in the purlins 
accordingly, the purlins should have been capable of supporting the actual snow load 
without overstress. 
Was it reasonable for the design engineer to assume that the purlins were fully 
braced by the standing seam roof? Probably not. Even though data on the bracing 
provided by comparable standing seam roof systems was not published until after the 
building was erected, it undoubtedly was known at the time that 100% bracing was an 
unrealistic expectation. In the absence ofliterature, it was incumbent on designers at this 
juncture in time to either use discrete bracing, such as straps, or to perform tests on their 
own specifIc systems. 
Conclusions an Lessons Learned 
The cause of this collapsed was not determined to a high level of certainty. 
Several allegations of improper design, such as the apparent overstress at purlin laps and 
the apparent disregard for drifting snow, were eliminated as potential causes. Likewise, it 
was shown that the degree of bracing afforded by the standing seam roof appeared 
sufficient to support the estimated precipitation, although the bracing was not as effective 
as the designer had assumed and though it would not safely support code loads. 
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It is even possible that other unidentified factors contributed to the collapse, such 
as deficiencies in erection, fabrication, or even abuse of the structure by tenants hanging 
loads from the roof that it was not intended to carry. 
The most important lesson to be learned from this collapse is the importance of 
ensuring that the assumptions made by the designer regarding the degree of bracing 
provided to the purlins are based on solid engineering data. For it is likely that if a 
realistic degree of bracing had been assumed by the designer, that the roof would have 
survived the storm. 
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